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 We are now in the midst of an exciting multidisciplinary revival of work on the moral 
sentiments. As recently as 1989, a commentator could reasonably write that he knew “of no 
living author who has thought to call herself a sentimentalist.”1 The very existence of the present 
volume is a testament to just how much times have changed. Scholars across philosophy, 
political science, law and psychology, are now rediscovering that eighteenth-century 
sentimentalists such as David Hume and Adam Smith were correct to emphasize the centrality of 
passion and emotion to moral judgment. This work has profound repercussions for how we think 
about virtually all major questions in ethics, politics and the law, among other fields. But the 
sentimentalist theory that moral judgments contain emotions actually has very few important, 
substantive moral implications. 
 It may sound strange to say that a moral theory may be deeply important without having 
many important substantive moral implications. By a substantive moral implication of a theory, I 
mean a concrete normative conclusion which one must draw from it directly on pain of logical 
contradiction. No further research is necessary, no additional premises need to be posited; 
anyone who affirms a theory but denies its implications is rationally inconsistent. There are thus 
many ways that a moral theory can have profound repercussions without having many important 
substantive moral implications. For one thing, it may have such implications when combined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joseph Duke Filonowicz, “Ethical Sentimentalism Revisited,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 6:2 
(April 1989), pp. 189-206, p. 192. “Most often,” Filonowicz continues, “the term is used polemically and 
tendentiously to brand vague themes thought to be barely worthy of serious consideration.” The fact that 
so many scholars today self-identify as sentimentalists is thus not only a remarkably intellectual 
development, but also a brazen act of linguistic reappropriation. Unfortunately, however, the term 
“sentimentalist” still retains its mawkish connotations in everyday usage. 
2 
	  
with other theories—but these are implications of a conjunction of theories, not of any single 
theory. Taken by itself, a moral theory may also have methodological rather than substantive 
implications; it may suggest how we should conduct future moral inquiries rather than what we 
must conclude. More generally, a theory may be a conversation starter rather than a conversation 
stopper, suggesting what new questions we should investigate, what new possibilities we should 
consider, without establishing any new and important conclusions which we must believe. Moral 
sentimentalism (or just “sentimentalism,” as I will call it) is important in all of these ways. 
 This essay will focus on what Jesse Prinz and many others have taken to be the most 
important substantive moral implication of sentimentalism. Sentimentalism is thought to imply 
moral relativism.2 Prinz defends this common view by arguing that, once the truth of 
sentimentalism is established, we must face the fact that “there may be moral conflicts that have 
no rational resolution” (p. XX). I think that Prinz is right here; no one can consistently affirm 
sentimentalism while denying that there may be moral conflicts that have no rational resolution. 
But I don’t think that anything much further follows from this implication—certainly nothing of 
particular importance for normative ethics, politics or law, and most certainly not moral 
relativism. After all, even if our moral conflicts are not capable of rational resolution, they may 
nonetheless be resolvable through non-rational means. It is my hope that they can be resolved in 
this way—and my conviction that they should be—that leads me to oppose relativism as both a 
philosophical theory and as a practical approach to ethics and politics. Yet both Prinz and I are 
sentimentalists, and our conceptions of what sentimentalism involves are essentially the same. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Prinz’s contribution to the present volume, as well as Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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 So how is it possible for two consistent defenders of sentimentalism to differ on so much 
else? It might be thought that some of the room for disagreement comes from the ambiguity of 
sentimentalism itself. While this is not the primary source of the dispute at hand, I do think that 
there are some ambiguities in the formulation of sentimentalism which need to be addressed. 
I accept Prinz’s “constitution model” of sentimentalism, which maintains that moral 
judgments contain emotions, rather than simply being judgments about emotions as under many 
so-called neo- (or, really, quasi-)sentimentalist theories today.3 But even once one accepts the 
constitution model, important ambiguities remain. The claim that moral judgments contain 
emotions can be understood as an empirical generalization, a conceptual necessity, or a 
normative precept. I actually think sentimentalism is probably true in all three of these ways. But 
philosophers can feel free to embrace one or two while rejecting the other(s). 
First, consider descriptive, empirical sentimentalism: the claim that, as a matter of 
psychological fact, most of our moral judgments can be observed to contain emotions most of the 
time. Prinz makes a strong case that this empirical generalization is well-supported by recent 
research in experimental psychology and neuroscience. Yet this descriptive theory, while 
undoubtedly preferable to its rivals, is nothing new. To the contrary, it has been widely accepted 
throughout the Western philosophical tradition. Indeed, it has been accepted even by most 
philosophers classified as moral rationalists. And any theory embraced by Plato, the Stoics, 
Spinoza and Kant, as well as by Hume and Smith, is hardly even deserving of the name 
sentimentalism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For two prominent examples of such quasi-sentimentalist theories, see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt 
Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990 and Justin 
D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “Sentiment and Value.” Ethics 110 (2000), pp. 722-748, the latter of which 
introduced the idea of calling such views “neosentimentalist.” 
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One would be hard-pressed to find a major, canonical moral rationalist who denied that 
emotions are a component of most of our moral judgments most of the time. Plato would hardly 
be surprised to see that most experimental subjects are governed by passion rather than reason. 
Most subjects in experimental psychology are undergraduates, after all, and there is nothing 
more sophomoric than being governed by one’s passions. Yet even if empirical sentimentalism is 
also true for most of us above the legal drinking age, what allowed Plato to be a rationalist is that 
he thought that the way most people make most moral judgments most of the time is irrelevant to 
moral philosophy. He embraced what Prinz, following today’s current psychological practice, 
calls a dual process model. There are two ways moral judgments can be formed, one of which 
includes emotion and one which does not. The former results in moral opinion, while the latter 
results in moral knowledge. Knowledge is incomparably superior to opinion, and wields an 
authority which opinion lacks.4 The goal of philosophy is thus to allow us to form judgments on 
the basis of reason alone. Since only a tiny minority, beneficiaries of either very rare divine gifts 
or a very particular education (most decidedly not the kind of education available to today’s 
undergraduates), could ever hope to achieve moral knowledge, only they will form moral 
judgments which do not contain emotion.5 For those concerned with empirical generalizations, 
these philosopher-kings (if any exist at any given time) would be mere outliers. Plato’s is not the 
kind of dual-process model subject to empirical falsification. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For two of the many Platonic discussions of the superiority of moral knowledge to moral opinion, see 
Meno 97a-100b (In Plato, Complete Works, Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John Cooper. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997, pp. 895-897) and Republic 477-480 (pp. 1103-1107). 
5 For the claim that only a minority will achieve moral knowledge or understanding, see, among many 
other passages in the Platonic corpus, Timaeus 51e (Cooper, ed., p. 1254). The educational plan designed 
to produce moral knowledge takes up much of the Republic; see especially 376-417 (pp. 1015-1052) and 
503-541 (pp. 1123-1155). 
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That said, empirical sentimentalism does imply an empirical version of the claim that not 
all moral conflicts are capable of rational resolution. As long as the mass of humanity remains 
stuck in the mire of conflicting passions, and hence conflicting moral opinions, any disagreement 
with or among them will not be rationally resolvable. In Plato’s view, our only hope is that those 
who are incapable of moral knowledge may come to possess true moral opinions through non-
rational means. The rational few must therefore manipulate the passionate many to comply with 
reason’s demands, and must do so through some combination of coercion and deception. This is 
the ultimate ground of the philosophical elite’s right to absolute rule over the non-philosophical 
masses.6 
Of course, one need not be an elitist or anti-egalitarian in order to accept sentimentalism 
as an empirical generalization while nonetheless remaining a rationalist along roughly Platonic 
lines. Kant, too, had a dual-process model, one which was just as scientifically untestable as 
Plato’s. Here, the distinction between opinion and knowledge is replaced by a distinction 
between heteronomous and autonomous moral judgment. While heteronomous judgment is the 
result of empirically observable causal forces—with what Kant called “Neigung” (“inclination”) 
foremost among them—autonomous judgment is the self-legislation of pure, noumenal reason. 
All rational agents as such are capable of this self-legislation, but even on introspection they can 
never be sure that they have achieved it. Although an action may clearly be in conformity with 
duty, we can never be entirely certain it was done from duty, and hence possessed genuine moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See, among other defenses of this claim in the Republic, 484b-484d (Cooper, ed., pp. 1107-1108). There 
are, of course, many scholars who would dismiss the interpretation in this and the preceding paragraph as 
a caricature of Plato’s actual views, views which are notoriously difficult to pin down on the basis of 
literary works as complex as the dialogues. My goal here is not so much to interpret Plato accurately 
(though, for the record, I do believe my interpretation to be correct) as to  describe a recognizably 
Platonic position which can involve the simultaneous embrace of empirical sentimentalism and moral 
rationalism 
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worth. “In fact,” Kant writes, “it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out 
with complete certainty a single case in which an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested 
simply on moral grounds.”7 And just as this knowledge is unavailable to agents themselves, it is 
also unavailable to outside researchers, even those equipped with fMRIs. Kant acknowledges 
that, because all moral judgments manifest themselves as empirical phenomena, they will 
certainly appear to be heteronomously determined. And as long as humanity remains made of 
crooked timber, this appearance is accurate for most of us most of the time. But the possibility of 
rational autonomy remains, and it is incumbent upon all of us to strive to achieve it.8 
Although rationalists can grant that emotion really is a component of most of our moral 
judgments most of the time, they maintain that a different kind of moral judgment, one free of 
emotion, is both possible and normatively superior. Sentimentalism, to be worthy of the name, 
must rule this out. There are two paths available: Sentimentalists can either deny the possibility 
of purely rational moral judgment, or they can deny its normative superiority. Either way, 
sentimentalism cannot simply be an empirical theory. 
Let’s examine the conceptual path first. Here is hardly the place to rehash the reasons 
why the impossibility of a phenomenon cannot be established on empirical grounds alone. Even 
if this claim is not true universally, one is hard-pressed to imagine what sort of scientific research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Translated by Mary J. Gregor in 
Practical Philosophy, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Translated and Edited by 
Mary J. Gregor. General Introduction by Allen Wood. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
4:407, p. 61. 
8 My interpretation of Kant in this paragraph, while not obvious to every reader of the Groundwork, is 
reflective of the current scholarly consensus on the matter. See Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 17-49; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: 
Essays on Aesthetics and Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 335-393; and 
Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. pp. 
146-187. As with my interpretation of Plato, however, my goal here is primarily to outline a recognizably 
Kantian position which incorporates both empirical sentimentalism and moral rationalism, and which 
does so without the objectionable elitism of the Platonic position described earlier. 
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could be conducted to rule out the sort of purely rational moral judgment that Plato and Kant 
describe. Most twentieth-century anti-rationalists therefore sought to rule out this possibility on 
conceptual grounds. The claim that moral judgment contains emotion is, they claimed, implicit in 
the very idea of morality itself, and can be established using the armchair techniques of 
conceptual analysis.9 I think they were probably right, but, the literature on the matter has grown 
so baroque over the past century, and my skills as an analytic philosopher are so limited, that I 
remain unsure. 
Fortunately, the separate path of normative sentimentalism is also available. If conceptual 
sentimentalism were true, then one of its implications would be normative sentimentalism. Since 
ought implies can, if purely rational moral judgments are a contradiction in terms, then it cannot 
be our duty to pursue them. But normative sentimentalism can also be established independently 
of its conceptual cousin. Even if purely rational moral judgments were possible, there is no 
reason to believe that they would be superior to judgments containing emotions. Or, more 
modestly, even if they might be possible for some sort of conceivable rational being, they are not 
the sort of judgments we should ever attempt. Adam Smith suggests as much when he notes that 
the kinds of moral judgments which might be appropriate for God to make are not appropriate 
for creatures such as ourselves.10 Given the independence of normative from conceptual 
sentimentalism, twentieth-century analytic metaethicists did sentimentalism a real disservice by 
focusing almost exclusively on moral concepts and moral language. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For the classic statements of metaethical sentimentalism in its “emotivist” variant see Alfred Jules Ayer, 
Language, Truth and Logic (1936). New York: Dover Publications, 1952, Ch. 6 (pp. 102-119) and 
Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944/1960. 
10 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.. Edited by A. L. Macfie and D. D Raphael. 
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1759/1790/1984, III.5.7, p. 166. 
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It might be easy to confuse my claim that sentimentalism has no important ethical or 
political implications with the widespread (if nonetheless controversial) view that metaethics is 
separate from normative ethics.11 Yet normative sentimentalism is itself a matter of moral 
judgments, albeit ones about general psychological processes rather than specific substantive 
ethical or political issues. The sharp distinction between conceptual metaethics and normative 
ethics was unknown to the original sentimentalists of the Enlightenment era, and need play no 
role in the revival of sentimentalism today.  
There were, admittedly, rough analogues to the current distinction between metaethics 
and normative ethics in eighteenth-century philosophy. The seventh and final part of Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments—one of the first modern historical surveys of Western moral 
philosophy—begins by observing that there are two questions to be considered when examining 
the principles of morals. “First, wherein does virtue consist? ... And, secondly, by what power or 
faculty of the mind is it that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us?”12 It might be 
thought that the first of these is the Enlightenment-era equivalent of normative ethics, while the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The first half of the twentieth century was the heyday of the belief in the moral neutrality of metaethics, 
a position defended by Stevenson and Ayer (op. cit.) among many others. By the 1960s, the dominant 
view had a number of prominent opponents; see Alan Gewirth, “Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics,” 
Mind New Series 69:274 (April 1960), pp. 187-205; Gewirth, “Metaethics and Moral Neutrality,” Ethics 
78:3 (April 1968), pp. 214-225; and R. C. Solomon, “Normative and Meta-Ethics,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 31:1 (September 1970), pp. 97-107. In order to appreciate the full 
importance of this debate, remember that Stevenson, Ayer and their ilk maintained that only analytic 
metaethics really qualified as moral philosophy, and hence that philosophy as such should not be 
concerned with normative questions. Those who rejected the moral neutrality of metaethics were thus 
implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) defending the philosophical legitimacy of addressing normative 
issues. Given the re-emergence of normative moral and political philosophy from the 1970s onward, it 
might be thought that Gewirth and Solomon had decisively won the argument. Yet a widespread belief in 
the independence of metaethics and normative ethics remained—albeit now as a defense of a division of 
labor between two forms of philosophically legitimate enquiry. Indeed, in a reverse of the once-dominant 
view, some philosophers even began appealing  to the moral neutrality of metaethics to argue that only 
normative ethics was truly worthy of philosophical attention; see Peter Singer, “The Triviality of the 
Debate over ‘Is-Ought’ and the Definition of ‘Moral,’” American Philosophical Quarterly 10:1 (January 
1973), pp. 51-56. 
12 Smith, op. cit., VII.1.2, p. 265. 
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second is equivalent to metaethics, especially since Smith maintains that the second question, 
taken in isolation, “though of the greatest importance in speculation, is of none in practice.”13 I 
will deal at the conclusion of this essay with Smith’s insistence that this question is of only 
speculative importance. For now, though, it is important to note that this is an empirical and 
psychological question, not a conceptual or linguistic one. Smith divided moral philosophy into 
descriptive moral psychology on the one hand and a form of virtue-theoretic normative ethics on 
the other, with little place left for the analysis of moral concepts.  
Although Smith has been largely neglected by recent analytic metaethicists, Hume has 
not been so fortunate. Countless analytic commentators have written under the assumption that 
Hume must have intended to give something resembling an analysis of moral concepts. Given 
the superficial absence of such an analysis from his ethical writings, they conclude that it must 
be lurking somewhere implicitly. Many inconsistent analyses have been proposed. As Michael 
Slote recounts, Hume has been read as a subjectivist descriptivist (“x is right” means “I approve 
of x”), an expressivist emotivist, (“Hurray for x!”), an ideal observer theorist (“a precisely 
specified perfect spectator would approve of x”), a projectivist error theorist (our approval of x 
lead us to assert falsely that it has a property of goodness which it does not actually possess) and, 
in Slote’s innovation, possibly even a proto-Kripkean reference-fixing theorist (a position too 
complicated to explain here). Although all these metaethical theories can be categorized as 
sentimentalist, they are all inconsistent with one another. Slote believes all can be put forward as 
plausible interpretations of Hume, but concludes that “if one wants to be more consistent than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., VII.iii.intro.3, p. 315. 
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Hume seems to have been, then one has to decide among these theories or advocate some 
different sentimentalist account.”14  
Yet there is another option open to sentimentalists: to avoid conceptual sentimentalism 
entirely, and to defend their theory on empirical and normative grounds alone. If this is indeed 
the path that Hume chose, it should come as no surprise that attempts to wrestle a consistent 
analysis of moral concepts from the pages of Hume’s Treatise have led Slote and others to reject 
Hume as metaethically confused and inconsistent. The same would be true of any author who 
was simply uninterested in analytic metaethics as it is practiced today. 
There are many ways to defend normative sentimentalism without relying on conceptual 
sentimentalism. First, normative sentimentalists may simply determine that the sort of moral 
judgments that most of us make most of the time are pretty much fine as they are. Such 
sentimentalists embrace a single rather than a dual process model, claiming that all of us make 
moral judgments more or less the same way, and that no better alternatives are available. One 
might take this a step further, and claim that when these everyday moral judgments come into 
conflict with one another—as they undeniably do with remarkable frequency—we should not 
conclude that one is morally right and the other is morally wrong. All moral sentiments are 
morally fine for those who feel them; one moral opinion is as morally good as any other.15  
This universal approval of everyone’s moral sentiments is the normative position which I 
think is most deserving of the label “moral relativism,” although the term has also been used to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 47-48. 
15 Prinz (2007, op. cit.) maintains that this view, but holds open the possibility that some moral sentiments 
may be better than others in various non-moral ways. Some may be more likely to promote the general 
welfare than others, for example, but this is not grounds for arguing for their moral superiority as such. 
Since most of us believe that advancing the general welfare is (at least ceteris paribus) morally desirable, I 
fail to see how he can distinguish moral approval and disapproval from their non-moral variants in this 
way.  
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identify a number of other normative views, as well as a variety of theories in conceptual 
metaethics.16 As with normative sentimentalism, normative relativism can be defended either via 
appeal to or independent of its conceptual variant. If moral claims really are claims that are true 
or false only relative to some feature of the claimant, then it would be wrong to conclude that 
apparently conflicting claims made by different individuals are actually in conflict. It could then 
be argued that resolving the apparent conflict between them would then be impossible, for there 
might not actually be any conflict to resolve.17 Yet even if it were possible, such resolution might 
still be normatively undesirable—perhaps because moral conflict is something which ought to be 
tolerated, or even celebrated, rather than resolved away.     
As I have already made clear, however, normative relativism is not an implication of 
sentimentalism. This is because even normative sentimentalism is fully compatible with a kind of 
dual process model, one not all that different from the Platonic opinion/knowledge model or the 
Kantian heteronomy/autonomy model. Regardless of how most of us make moral judgments 
most of the time, sentimentalists like Hume and Smith believe that we can do better. In this 
respect, they are no different from Plato or Kant. But they flesh out this dual-process model in a 
distinctly sentimentalist way.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For an examination of some of the many possible theories which could reasonably go under the name 
“moral relativism,” as well as a defense of most (but not all) of them, see the essays collected in “Part I: 
Moral Relativism,” in Gilbert Harman, Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 3-99. 
17 There are, however, legitimate doubts about the validity of this argument, as well as all other arguments 
from conceptual to normative relativism. It is certainly possible that there is a disanalogy here between 
the relationship between conceptual and normative sentimentalism on the one hand, and conceptual and 
normative relativism on the other. While conceptual sentimentalism implies normative sentimentalism, 
conceptual relativism may or may not imply normative relativism—and there is no need to determine 
whether or not it does for purposes of this essay.	  
18 This sentimentalist account of how we can improve our moral reflection is one of the main subjects 
addressed in my book The Enlightenment of Sympathy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. It was 
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As Prinz makes clear, the two main moral sentiments are those of moral approval and 
disapproval. As he also observes, these sentiments can be self- as well as other-directed. Inherent 
in feeling a sentiment of self-disapproval is a sense that we are not doing what we ought to be 
doing, that we can do better. What Prinz fails to mention explicitly is that among the behaviors 
which can be subject to both self- and other-disapproval are our feelings of approval and 
disapproval themselves. But I do think this is the best way to make sense of the case he describes 
of the recovering homophobe, in which “a bigoted automatic appraisal” that homosexuality is 
wrong is “outweighed by a considered appeal” that it is not, and in which the agent “identifies 
with the latter conviction” (p. XX). In other words, the recovering homophobe disapproves of his 
own disapproval of homosexuality, but has only partially completed the process of purging this 
wayward moral sentiment from his psyche. 
Every moral sentiment we feel is a possible candidate for such disapproval, including the 
higher-order sentiments which approve or disapprove of our lower-order ones. This raises the 
possibility of an open-ended process of moral self-scrutiny, in which our moral sentiments are 
continually turned against themselves.19 Other mental faculties—reason included—may play a 
role in this reflective process as well. Despite Hume’s famous bit of rhetoric about enslaving 
reason to the passions,20 it is clear that this reflection is to be carried out in a non-hierarchical, 
psychologically holistic way. Although philosophers may rightly distinguish the operations of 
the mind from another, Hume consistently maintains that in reality they are “uncompounded and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not until I was preparing the current essay, however, that I realized Hume and Smith were advocating a 
dual-process model along roughly Platonic lines. 
19 This is the moral component of the “progress of sentiments” described by Hume and made famous by 
Annette Baier in her book of that title. See Annette C. Baier, Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on 
Hume’s Treatise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
20 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739-1740 Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton. Oxford Philosophical Texts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 2.3.3.4, p. 266. 
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inseparable.”21 As a result, reason is neither privileged over nor really enslaved to sentiment, nor 
are higher-order sentiments privileged over lower-order ones. Our goal is a mind fully in 
harmony with itself, free from psychic conflict in any form. 
Although we can never reach a point when we possess certain, objective moral truths, we 
can reach a reflective equilibrium in which we can affirm that all our moral sentiments have been 
thoroughly tested. Such a progress of sentiments genuinely replaces moral opinion with a kind of 
moral knowledge. Yet as George Marcus observes in his contribution to this volume, 
“knowledge takes many forms” (p. XX). The sort of sentimentalist moral knowledge I want to 
defend is provisional rather than certain, and directed inward into the contingent makeup of the 
human psyche rather than outward into a non-contingent realm of moral reality—a realm of 
Platonic forms or necessary moral laws or what have you.22  
The sentimentalist reflective process described by Hume and Smith also involves a proto-
Kantian move from heteronomy to autonomy. Only through such a progress of sentiments can 
we take control of our moral lives. We consciously identify only with those moral sentiments 
which we can still endorse even after the greatest degree of critical self-reflection. What makes 
this view sentimentalist, however, is that these autonomous moral judgments contain emotion as 
surely as do heteronomous judgments. 
But the relevant progress of sentiments is not merely a matter of individual reflection, of 
self-directed approval and disapproval. It is also a matter of interpersonal evaluation. For better 
or worse, we approve and disapprove of others’ moral sentiments even more readily than we do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., 3.2.2.14, p. 317. 
22 For more on the distinction between these two forms of moral knowledge, see Michael B. Gill, “On the 
Alleged Incompatibility Between Sentimentalism and Moral Confidence,” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 15:4 (October 1998), pp. 411-440, especially p. 428. 
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of our own. To be sure, there is nothing in sentimentalism which precludes relativists from 
approving of moral judgments at odds with their own. But most of us do not share their 
sentiments. Most of us are inclined to disapprove of judgments which we do not share. Will this 
disapproval survive the process of reflective self-correction that I just described? To some 
degree, I think it probably will. But it will not emerge at the end of the reflective process 
unchallenged or unchanged. 
The primary challenge to our disapproval of others’ moral sentiments will come from 
sympathy or empathy.23 Prinz departs from his Enlightenment-era forbearers quite strikingly by 
rejecting their contention that sympathy is central to the psychological etiology of all our moral 
sentiments. We can bracket this general claim for purposes of this essay, however. Whatever role 
sympathy may play with regard to our moral sentiments generally, it certainly can play a role in 
helping improve our judgments of the moral sentiments of others, particularly those from cultural 
traditions in which moral sentiments very different from our own predominate. 
It is not that encountering alien moral views will necessarily lead us to empathize with 
those who advocate them. Far from it; fear and hatred are more common accompaniments to our 
disapproval of others’ moral judgments. If those holding alien worldviews are kept far from us, 
and do not affect our ability to live according to our own sentiments, these negative emotions 
will likely mellow into cold indifference. None of these attitudes are conducive to sympathy or 
empathy. But if we must interact on a daily basis with those of whom we disapprove—if we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For purposes of this essay, I can avoid the question of what difference, if any there is between 
sympathy and empathy, in part since only the former was available to the eighteenth-century authors who 
initiated sentimentalism. But do see, among others on the topic, Stephen Darwall, “Empathy, Sympathy, 
Care,” Philosophical Studies. 89 (1998), pp. 261-282. 
15 
	  
must build a common political life together—then there will be a desperate need for some way of 
accommodating each other.   
Here, Herder is a much better eighteenth-century inspiration than Hume or Smith.24 It 
was Herder who began the sort of inquiry into the origins of human moral sentiments which 
Nietzsche would later call genealogy. But while Nietzsche sought to debunk our moral 
commitments by revealing their ignoble origins, Herder sought to affirm most of the diverse 
moral sentiments he discovered across human cultures. The key, he argued, is to feel your way 
into the position of those whose histories and cultures, and hence whose judgments, are different 
from your own. Herder urges his readers to “go into the age, the clime, the whole history. Feel 
yourself into everything; only now are you on the way toward understanding…”25  
The task is not easy; we must overcome the natural biases of our sympathy, which tend to 
be strongest for those closest to and most like us, and weakest for those who are different or 
distant or both. Difficult, yes, but not impossible; Herder maintained that our natural wonder and 
curiosity at the range of human diversity would be sufficient to motivate the hard emotional 
work required. Add to this humanistic impetus the practical goal of finding a mode of mutual 
accommodation in a culturally (and hence also morally) diverse society—a practical goal which 
Herder did not consider adequately, largely because he was an adamant advocate of culturally 
uniform nation-states—and there is good reason to believe that many of us will at least attempt to 
empathize with our fellow citizens when we find ourselves in moral disagreement with them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For a fuller defense of the interpretation of Herder presented in the following paragraphs see The 
Enlightenment of Sympathy, op. cit., Chapter 6, pp. 139-167. 
25 Johann Gottfried Herder, This Too a Philosophy of History for the Education of Humanity (1774), In 
Michael N. Forster, Translator and Editor, Herder: Philosophical Writings. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 292.  
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Through this imaginative and emotional investigation, you may come to understand that 
sentiments which once seemed to be strange and unnatural actually speak to human needs and 
feelings analogous to your own. This, in turn, may change your disapproval into approval. 
Herder’s empathy may therefore look like another path to normative moral relativism. Indeed, 
many have interpreted Herder in precisely that way.26 But to understand all is not to approve of 
all. What is more, disapproval which remains once empathetic understanding is achieved seems 
likely to pass the test of sentimental reflection. The result is not relativism but value pluralism; 
there is a range of incompatible human values which can all be approved of, but there are also 
others which cannot be. This, at least, was the lesson Isaiah Berlin took from Herder.27 
But there is another possibility still. Someone who arrives at value pluralism via a 
sentimentalist path—as opposed to someone who is convinced that the plurality of values is 
rationally demonstrable—realizes that, like all moral knowledge, this pluralism can only be 
known provisionally. There is always the possibility that with greater sentimental reflection on 
the part of all parties concerned all of humanity will gradually converge on a single set of 
universal moral sentiments. This may seem improbable when it comes to standards of personal 
virtue, but there is a reasonable hope that it may be achieved when it comes to political justice. 
While Herder approved of many cultural differences, he also approved of a universal sentiment 
of justice based on our shared humanity and our love of reciprocity. As is well known, some 
version of the golden rule is present in all known human cultures, even if it is more honored in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For a few of the many descriptions of Herder as a relativist along roughly these lines, see Robert T. 
Clark, Herder: His Life and Thought. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1955, p. 320; 
Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987, pp. 142-143; and Arthur O. Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1948, p. 172. 
27 See Isaiah Berlin The Crooked Timber of Humanity. Edited by Henry Hardy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990, especially p. 76, as well as Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, 
Hamann, Herder. Incorporating Vico and Herder (1960) and The Magus of the North (1993). Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
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the breach than the observance.28 Herder believed that, given sufficient intrapersonal reflection 
and interpersonal deliberation, all would eventually come to embrace this humane ideal more 
fully, whatever their cultural background. “The law of reciprocity,” he insists, “is foreign to no 
nation.”29 
We will never be able to resolve all our moral disagreements on the basis of a single 
faculty of reason which all human beings share. But we may be able to resolve many, if perhaps 
not all, of our moral disagreements on the basis of other features we all share—most notably our 
susceptibility to emotions from physical pain to parental love, and our ability to understand and 
share the emotions of others. It is this, Herderian vision of sentimental consensus-building which 
I, for one, would like to see advanced in our moral, political and legal practices. But the ethics 
and politics of empathetic universalism are not implied by sentimentalism itself, anymore than 
the ethics and politics of relativism are so implied. 
The fact that sentimentalism can consistently be used to defend such different worldviews 
should come as no surprise. After all, if sentimentalism is true, the ethical and political 
convictions of rival sentimentalists contain emotions as surely as do all other moral judgments. 
The differences among their views therefore may not be resolvable through purely rational 
means. When we speak of the implications of sentimentalism, we are seeking exactly such a 
rational resolution—a logical deduction, from the shared premise of sentimentalism, which will 
demonstrate why one sentimentalist view is consistent and the other is inconsistent. A more 
promising approach would be to resolve disputes between sentimentalists in a sentimentalist 
manner—such as through greater empathetic inquiry into our interlocutors’ perspectives, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Jeffrey Wattles, The Golden Rule. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
29 Herder, Letters for the Advancement of Humanity (1793-7), in Forster, op. cit., p. 417. 
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greater reflective scrutiny of our own disapproval of their views. In adopting this approach, 
however, we must give up the idea that our interlocutors somehow failed to notice the direct 
normative implications of the premises we have in common. Nothing could be farther from the 
spirit of sentimentalism than dismissing moral worldviews with which we disagree as necessarily 
incoherent, let alone condemning those who embrace them as necessarily irrational. 
Perhaps this is part of the reason why the debate among the original sentimentalists of the 
Enlightenment era was such a marvelous model of philosophical civility. Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Herder and others at the time were united in their conviction that 
moral judgments contain emotions, but divided on most other moral and political questions—
from the proper place of religion in public life to the viability of democracy to the alleged 
superiority of European over so-called “primitive” peoples. But Smith’s disagreements with 
Hume, or Herder’s disagreements with them both, did nothing to lessen their admiration for each 
other. 
Smith was therefore wrong to deny the practical importance of moral psychology. To be 
sure, sentimentalism has no distinctive position on the question of moral relativism versus moral 
universalism, let alone on more specific issues like the proper level of progressivity in our tax 
system or the proper balance between the claims of individual liberty and those of collective 
security. But, in its normative form, sentimentalism can offer a distinctive position on how we 
ought to reflect individually, and deliberate collectively, on these and all other such difficult 
moral questions. Sentimentalism need not unleash hateful, unreflective emotions in our public 
discourse—or even relativist, tolerant indifference. A widespread embrace of specifically 
Herderian sentimentalism could instead lead to a cultivation of wide-ranging public empathy, 
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and might help in the often seemingly fruitless task of rendering our civil life more worthy of the 
name “civil.”  
Pointing out the practical importance of sentimentalism does not detract from its 
importance for what Smith calls “speculation.” Sentimentalism may also have profound 
importance for scholars, for philosophy understood in the eighteenth-century sense to include not 
only the normative and conceptual work which is today the responsibility of philosophers and 
political theorists, but also the empirical and interpretive scholarship which is now undertaken 
under the rubrics of the sciences and humanities. 
The humanities in particular must not be neglected as a potential resource for enriching 
sentimentalist thought. Rightly dissatisfied with the arid conceptual analysis which came to 
dominate philosophy in the twentieth century, philosophers today have sought to bring their 
work in closer contact with empirical reality. Yet, for too many of them, the turn to reality has 
taken a detour through the experimental neuropsychology lab. Many recent empirical 
sentimentalists have believed this scientific approach to be in keeping with the spirit of Hume, 
who famously introduced his Treatise as “an attempt to introduce the experimental method of 
reasoning into moral subjects.”30 Yet rather than using the term “experiment” to describe the 
controlled tests of today’s laboratory science, Hume instead associates “careful and exact 
experiments” with the simple “observation of those particular effects which result from… 
different circumstances and situations.”31 If experimentation in general is to be equated with 
careful observation, in the case of “moral subjects” experimentation will merely involve close 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hume, op. cit., Title Page, p. 1. For an experimental philosophy “manifesto” and a collection of essays 
on the topic, see Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, eds. Experimental Philosophy.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. For a more balanced appraisal of the value of experimental work in the field, see 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
31 Hume, op. cit., Introduction:8, p. 5. 
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observation of the operations of the social world around us and the psychological forces within 
us. For Hume, who was most famous in his own time as a historian and an essayist, these 
observations were not to be conducted in the laboratory under controlled conditions, but in the 
uncontrolled reality of human life, a reality that can only be captured in history and literature. 
Although controlled experimentation will always be invaluable in moral psychology—as it is in 
so many other fields—there is no reason to privilege it over humanistic inquiry when 
investigating the nature of human sentiments. 
Although (at least in my preferred version) sentimentalism is already a normative theory, 
the need for a humanistic version of sentimentalism is especially great when we turn from 
general normative conclusions about the proper place of emotion in moral judgment to specific 
ethical or political issues. Since sentimentalism implies that our disagreements on these issues 
may not always be resolvable by rational means alone, it might be taken to imply that rational 
scholarship has little or nothing to contribute to the resolution of these disputes. Alternately, 
however, a sentimentalist can consistently maintain that scholars can and should continue to 
write on particular normative questions. To do so effectively, however, they must not be afraid of 
employing modes of thought other than pure reasoning. Here, too, Herder can serve as a model: 
His condemnation of European imperialism and insistence on cultural diversity is not the product 
of mere logical argument, but rests on an understanding of human difference built from his 
extensive studies of comparative literature, world history, comparative religion and all the other 
fields of humanistic scholarship—fields which require imaginative insight and emotional 
sensitivity as much as they require sound reasoning and solid empirical evidence.32 As we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Herder’s utilization and defense of the humanities has important parallels with that put forward more 
recently by Martha Nussbaum. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of 
Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997 and Nussbaum, Not for 
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emerge out of an era in which philosophy was reduced to applied logic—the more formal the 
better—and into an age in which experimental science stands alongside a priori argumentation as 
a means of attaining philosophical insight, Herder reminds us that a third, emotionally-laden 
mode of philosophizing is available, and is capable of establishing the truth of substantive ethical 
and political conclusions. In many cases, it may be the only effective means of doing so. 
An appreciation that moral philosophy and political theory are emotional as well as 
intellectual work could potentially lead to profound changes in the practice of these disciplines. 
The full revolutionary potential of sentimentalism will be apparent, however, only when we 
realize that the importance of a moral theory can have no correlation whatsoever with the 
importance of its substantive moral implications.    
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